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Abstract 
Unexpected flood had struck P7irts  of the  capital town of Djibouti many times in  the past.  In 
1994,  such flooding killed more than 100 people and a decade later, it had claimed over 300 
(according to  United Nations' sources in  2004).  Those  heavily affected were the inhabitants 
along the plains of the "Ambouli  Oued~ who  depend on vegetable gardens for sustenance. 
These  floods  generally occur with  their  associated diseases  such  as  cholera  outbreaks. 
Evacuating the people from  the flood-prone areas and providing them with  alternative place 
of  settlement seem not to work well.  This paper exposes the complexity of  the problem in the 
case  of this  catchment and explores  the  necessity of adopting an  integrated approach  to 
solve  it.  It is not an easy challenge to convince decision-makers due to conflicting land and 
water  uses  that  are  numerous  in  this  area,  namely:  (i)  protection  of the  capital  against 
flooding,  (N)  small-scale  agriculture  in  place,  (iii)  protection  of the  fragile  aquifer,  (iv) 
development of new projects (harbour,  urbanisation),  and (v)  protection of the environment. 
Among  the  many  constraints  are  lack  of data  and human  resources,  weak  institutional 
arrangements, lack of  col/ective memory, fatalism of  decision makers, weak implication of  the 
land and water users,  and importantly enough the weight of development aid agencies that 
decide with their own agenda. 
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Introduction: the context 
The  Republic  of Djibouti  is  a tiny  country  of the  Horn  of Africa,  independent from  France 
since  1977.  It  is classified  as  both  a  least developed  and  a low­
income,  food-deficit  country.  The  UNDP  Human  Development 
Report  for  2000  ranked  Djibouti  among  the  "low  human 
development" countries (149
1h  out of 174 countries).  Located  in  a 
geo-strategic place of East Africa, along a major oil route, the state 
receives  large  compensations for the  presence  of French  Troops 
and  more  recently,  since  2002  from  the  US  Army.  Traditional 
donors  (European  Union,  African  Development  Bank,  Arab 
countries, France, Japan) as well as private investors are  relatively 
active. 
There is no permanent river in the  Republic of Djibouti.  Indeed the 
climate  is  considered  to  be  arid  to  hyper  arid.  Mean  Annual 
Precipitation averages 147 mm. in a very erratic and uneven way. Extreme values have been 
observed  such  as  9,5  mm  in  1980 and  693  mm  in  1989.  Watercourses  are  here  called 
"oued" in reference to the Arab word "wadf'. Flash runoff is the way the oueds run, generally 
through few annual events during very short periods (FAO, 1995). The Ambouli Oued is one 
of the  main  non-perennial  rivers  of the  country.  Its  60D-km2  catchment  has  an  elongated 
shape and steep slopes in its upper watershed. It joins the Red Sea in Djibouti-ville and  the 
slope is almost zero (0,3 %) in the five kilometers-long last reach. Hydrology data are scarce, 
since the network established by a German research programme (Muller et aI,  1982) in  the 
eighties  has been  completely dismantled. There  is  only  one  meteorological  station  for  the 
whole country, at Ambouli International Airport. 
Figure  1 : location In 
East Africa ..... 

A In  this article the authors wish to present the challenges ana analyze the thorny process of 
nl giving birth to infrastructures aimed at protecting the capital-city of Djibouti. They point out the 
pi necessity to develop an integrated river basin approach. Since the flow is not permanent and 
g: the floods relatively rare, the task is a real challenge. 
o Mitigating the Ambouli oued floods' effects 
The  country  has  always  experienced  problems  of flooding,  quoted  as  the  third  problem  W 
affecting the country after drought and earthquake  (Igad, 2004).  .  CI 
In  March  2004, the  Presidency of the  Republic asked  the Ministry of Agriculture,  Ufestock  W 
g and  Sea,  in  charge  of Water Resources,  to  reactivate  a  previous  plan  called  "integrated 
(t watershed development  of  the Ambouli oued ". The aim is  to protect the city of Djibouti-ville 
P against flooding but also to limit silting in the new harbour in  construction. A working group  2,
has been created and meetings started in order to define terms of reference of such a study. 
IT But during  the  night of April  12  tn  2004, a catastrophic flash  flood  event took place,  killing 
C dozens  of people  and  destroying  goods  and  infrastructures.  After these  dreadful  events, 
it European Union, a major donor in Djibouti, proposed to partly finance protection works and in 
order to do so, launched a pre-feasability study. 
T 
I Method 
This paper is based on an analysis of existing documents and interviews of decision-makers 
and  water  users  during  the  last flood.  The  authors  have  accompanied,  in  October  2004­
experts  (from  COWI-BCEOM)  during  the  prefaisability  study.  A  total  of  eight 
interdepartmental meetings took place during the last six months. The point of view of donors 
(World Bank, European Union, French  Embassy, Japan) is  also examined. The institutional 
arrangements to conduct such project, as well as the administrative complexity and problems 
of responsibility are assessed.  . 
Results 
The last flood: an obvious lack of information and organisation 
Heavy Rains  (106 mm, Djibouti Airport station) 
came in few hours. Although it is very difficult 
to  estimate  the  peak  flow  without  gauging 
stations, BCEOM estimated that the flood was 
a  15  years  return  period  event  (Perrin  et aI,  1 
2004).  The  1100  m
3/s  peak  flow  came  S 
suddenly,  during the  night, while the  tide was  tl 
high. The fact that no flush flood took place in  C 
the last couple of years made the outset full of  J , sediments.  Furthermore  the  minor bed  is  not 
clearly  identified.  Possibly  several  obstacles  E 
slowed  down  the  water:  a  bridge  and  a  :/:·1 .... 
concrete  road  downstream.  Intensive  I 
vegetable  gardens  in  the  minor  bed  (fig.  2)  f 
were  initially accused  to have played  a major 
role.  They formed indeed a  "bottleneck" in the last reach before the sea: no more than 20 

meters wide when the normal size of minor bed measures more than 50 meters. However the 

experts estimated it was not the major reason for the disaster (Perrin et aI, 2004). 

The main explanation is different: the Ambouli oued had very different watercourses in  the 

past, with frequent ones flowing East, while it flows at present to the North after a gO-degrees 

angle (see Spot image Fig A ). 
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Although  the official  death toll  stands  at 58,-other sources such  as  WHO's report said  the 
number of dead reaches 300 people (WHO. 2004). Without a doubt many victims where very 
poor  people,  refugees  from  neighbouring  countries,  watchmen  or  labourers  living  in  the 
gardens (Fewsnet, 2004). 
Damages included complete destruction of about 100 houses located in the direct path of the 
waterflow.  20 000 houses suffered losses of one sort or another (Fewsnet, 2004), a road  in 
construction  was  destroyed  as well  as  the  railway,  a school,  a dispensary,  many cars  and 
water supply pipes.  Basic services were suspended for several days. The majority of the 236 
gardens  was  swept  out.  The  total  cost  for  Djibouti  was  estimated  to  be  10  millions  US$ 
(Ministry of Interior, quoted in Fewsnet, 2004) . 
Prevention of the disaster as well as organisation of assistance went very badly (Perrin et ai, 
2004).  Without external troops' involvement, the  death  toll  could  have  been worse.  Indeed 
many people were saved thanks to helicopters. 
Only the  preventive  measures  against the  possible  cholera  outbreak were  well  conducted 
thanks to UN agencies and other donors. 
The death toll is increasing v/ith time 
In  its recent history, Djibouti has been affected by a succession of floods with not less than 
seven major events since independence. 
Table  1 : the last floods  in DJibouti-ville 
Year  Death  Affected*  Estimated  Estimated  Estimated 
to\l*  Population  Peak  Flow  Return 
of  the  m3/s  period 
town***  (BCEOM) 
1977  0  85000  160000 
1978  0  106000  170000 
1981  25  102000  190000 ' 
1989  10  150000  270000  1250  20 years 
1993  0  20000  290000 
1994  145  120000  300000  1500  25 years 
2004  510r  100000  400000  1100  15 years 
300** 
Source: *" EM-DA T,  ** WHO, ***Ministry of  Habitat 
The death toll seems to increar.e with time although the magnitude of flow has not increased 
significantly. Human pressure is probably the major reason. Indeed, since independence, the 
town  has  grown  steadily  with  a  high  birth  rate,  immigration  from  war-prone  neighbouring 
countries as well as massive rural exodus. 
A  key  conclusion  of BCEOM's  work  is  that  the  magnitude  of the  last flood  was  not 
exceptional:  what could  have  been  the  impacts  of a  100  or a  1000  years  return  period 
event? Hundreds of victims, billions of doll,,:lrs: no estimates have been done yet but one can 
imagine  dreadful  figures.  Furthermore  two  major public infrastructures, the  drinking  water 
supply plan and the powerstation are precisely located in flood-prone areas. The disruption of 
these services could  seriously hamper the development of the whole economy of this fragile 
country. 
Water Users ignore each other 
The low Ambouli watershed is characterized  by the development of many human activities. 
The town  regroups about 75 % at the population of the country and concentrates 95 % of the 
economy.  The location of Djibouti-ville, as  a capital of this former French  overseas territory 
was  decided  in  1888  preCisely  because  of the  presence  of fresh  water from  the  Ambouli 
oued.  Progressively with the development of the town,  this resource was not sufficient and 
more than hundred boreholes (number 1 on figure 3) were drilled on fissured basalts. 
3 At the same time peri-urban irrigated gardens mushroomed and were even encouraged by 
the  state:  farmers  of  Yemeni  origin  came  to  grow  vegetables  and  develop  diary  milk 
production (2). 
With  urban  pressure  (3)  many  infrastructures  were  constructed  near  the  river  despite 
legislation taken by the state, including schools and dispensaries but also  new roads (4). 
Consequently with urban expansion, demand for material of construction is partly furnished 
by gravels (sand collection are numerous in the basin: number 5). 
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Upstream, in  rural areas where around 10 000 persons are living  I  the land of  the watershed 
provides  firewood  (6),  and  food  for extensive  livestock  (mainly  goats).  There  are  already 
signs of over-grazing in this  the fragile acacia-based ecosystem. 
Downstream. near the shores three indirect users have been identified: the harbour (7),  the 
environment (mangrove and  coral  reefs:  8),  and  finally the fishermen  (9).  These users are 
indirectly concerned  by floods but must not be forgotten during the impact study of a future 
project. 
Table 2 : Ambouli watershed users 
Users of  the  Links with the floods  Economic  Livelihoods 
watershed  importance 
1  Aquifer, water supply  Wells' destruction, pollution  +++ 
2  Agriculture, livestock  Human  victims  and  ++  +++ 
destruction  of  gardens and 
animals 
3  Urbanism, troops  Human  victims  indirect  +++  + 
w:lter-related diseases 
4  Infrastructures  rail,  Destruction  • slow down  the  ++ 
roads, bridge  flow 
5  Gravels extraction  Sand brought by floods  +  + 
4 6  Wood  collection  and  Acceleration of flow. erosion  ++ 
I  encouraged  by 
velop  diary  milk  7 
pastoralism 
Future harbour  Silting  ++ 
8  Mangrove  and  coral  Direct effects 
reefs 
he  river  despite 
lW roads (4). 
9  Fishermen  Pollution 
matter 
but  also  organic  +  ++ 
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From discussions with users and experts, several observations can be made: 
Users  pay no attention to the effects of their activities on  users other downstream. 
Every one thinks individually, although interactions are obvious. 
People have little memory of flooding especially in  the case  of such  non-perennial river. 
Even the French Army has installed troops and families in a very vulnerable part of the city. 
Most of the dead in 2004 were Gaid  to be Oromos, illegal migrants from Ethiopia, impossible 
to control as they hide themselves in order to avoid expulsion. There even ignore the risks of 
living there since there are often new immigrants in the country. 
The government stands weak in preventing people to live in this area and cooperation 
between departments is deficient. Thus in October 2004, only 6 months after the dreadful 
flood  people started to reconstruct many dwellings despite official warnings from  Ministry of 
Habitat. Indeed the Ministry of Interior is incapable to enforce the law. 
One must keep In mind that people have little working opportunities and this peri-urban 
agriculture  is  a  fantastic  source  of  jobs  and  money.  The  authors  met  a  gardener 
reconstructing  his  plot  after  he  lost  his  5 brothers  and  sisters.  Similar  activities  such  as 
extractions of gravels or wood  collection were fustigated  after the flood  but again  no police 
action was put in place.  ' 
Furthermore no responsibility was assumed in the aftermath of the flood. Insurers have not 
reimbursed  anything.  Nobody was  accused  of negligence.  neither the  state  (in  charge  of 
protecting  the  citizens),  nor  the  City  Council  (in  charge  of  infrastructure  development). 
Fatalism was the main driving explanation of the disaster. 
No plan yet to prevent the next disaster 
Finally, even 9 months after the drama, no early warning system has been established, 
even  a rudimentary  one.  This  system  is  however absolutely indispensable considering  the 
speed of the phenomenons. For instance during the 1994 flood,  no rain occurred in Djibouti­
ville  but only in  the upstream basin.  In  a country with  three armies and very sophisticated 
satellite imagery monitoring,  efficient weather forecast and  early warning  system should  be 
realistic (if not easy) objectives to achieve. 
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The new Project Proposal (expertise of BCEOM : Perrjn et aI, 2004 ) 
Three  main  stakes  are 
considered:  (i)  protecting  the 
city  but  also  (ii)  reinforcing 
water  resources  for  Djibouti 
(iii)  preserving  the  gardens 
from destruction. 
After investigation and  visit of 
all  possible  dam  sites  the 
following proposal is done. 
It is proposed to build a multi­
purpose  dam  that  can  divert 
the  exceeding  flow  in  its 
natural  and  former  course 
(see  fig  4).  Design  must  be 
done  considering  a  "1000 
years  return  period".  This 
level of safety is needed since 
people  are  physically 
threatened. A 3000 m3/s peak 
flow and a volume of event of 
34 M m3 will be considered for 
project design. 
Since the topography is  quite 
flat,  a  15  meters-high  earth 
dam is proposed.  It will  store 
( 
As  said  before,  flooding  has  always  been  an  issue  here  and  many  studies  have  been  E 
launched in the past. But no Significant infrastructure has been completed yet.  In  the mean  • 
time urbanization has been pursued without consideration of flooding risks. 
After the  1989 floods,  terms  of Reference for a masterplan for an  Integrated  Project were 
prepared  but the project was abandoned  ...  until the 1994 flood.  Then a  new version of the 
Terms of Reference was prepared but no plan was drawn ...  until 2004, when a new disaster 
happened.  In  sum  it seems that each  time  destructive floods  happened.  assignments are 
promised.  But each time,  since  nobody press the  case,  neither users nor authorities,  the  • 
project does not take off. 
It  is  now time for action.  Keepi:1g  the  pace  is  possible,  because  today funding  is a  reality 

thanks to European Union. The cost is huge: 30  M US$ (with  12 millions for infrastructures 

and  18 for basin  development) .  But it is  not more than  the  total  cost of two  to  three  of 
 • 
flooding events. And of course saving lives is an immeasurable gain. 
Avoiding silting up of the future dam 
Considering  desertification  underway  in  the  basin,  high  rain  intensity  and  steep  slopes. 

consultants (Perrin et al 2004) think erosion is the major dilemma to solve. The lifetime of the 

dam could be limited to  less than 20 years with the current level of sedimentation (Perrin et 

ai,  2004).  Therefore  soil  conservation  measures are  cruciaL  The  budget proposed  for that 
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Fig 4:  Spot image of Djibouti-ville area,  showing the project. A 
dam (1) will be constructed. In case of extreme flow the surplus 
will flow to the East in the Douda Oued through a spillway (2) 
3 to 5 M m
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task is significant, more expensive than the iAfrastructures themselves. How can one achieve 
that objective of avoiding costly mistakes? 
A striking necessity for Integrated Water Resources Management 
The new project was prepared by a consultant with donors and  departments assistance but 
yet without users'involvement. This lack of public participation in the debate is  probably a 
mistake.  Mobilization  of  users  is  a  guarantee  of  public  pressure  to  really  achieve  the 
program. It must start now during the next stage: the feasibility study 
Involvement of people must' become a very high priority. Mobilisation of population in the 
upper basin must start now and  be carried on during 15 years. The ideal would be to get the 
assistance  of NGOs  in  order to  manage  this  local  participation.  But  NGOS  are  rare  and 
inexperienced in Djibouti. 
The main funding agency (EU) is also worried: who will manage such project when  public 
services  are insufficiently trained  and  often  disorganized.  The  idea  to  create  a Catchment 
Management Agency (CMA) regrouping all stakeholders is probably relevant. 
Finally  it is  still  necessary to  look for supplemental  funding  for this  ambitious  project.  The 
World  Bank has  promised  a 5 millions dollars  but to  fix schools  • dispensaries and  a dyke 
destroyed during the 2004 flood. Japan could be involved in the funding of land conservation 
but wants to quantify the risks of investing in long-time involvement with communities. Only a 
strong mobilization of users will oblige donors to sit around the table. 
Conclusion 
Flooding is likely to persist in these flood-prone areas of Djibouti-ville. Drastic measures have 
to be taken quickly, especially to build an early warningsystem. 
The government of Djibouti  has  now in  hands a first-class  proposal  prepared  by  European 
Union  . The  huge  cost presented  will  be  easily cost-effective  if one  considers  the  possible 
costs of 100 or worse a 1000 years return event. 
But many efforts have still to be made to see the project becoming reality: 
•  first of all there is  a need of  political commitment to grasp the project.  If the project is 
again elapsed for several years, a new catastrophe is predictable. The laws concerning 
housing must be applied and  nobody can be authorised to stay in the minor bed of the 
Oued. Again  a flood  early warning system is the priority.  It needs to  integrate weather 
forecasts,  detection  (rainfall  and  flood  levels).  communication  (relay of information  to 
flood response team), and decision to evacuate. 
•  second  is  sharing  information  with  all  and  making  the  scheme  a common  project  of 
water users of the Ambouli oued basin. Mobilisation of energies from the whole basin is 
compulsory to avoid silting up of the dam. Awareness of existing dangers should  be a 
collective  battle.  It also  must be  understood  as  a real  opportunity to  fight poverty  in 
these peri-urban areas. 
•  Finally the government has now to handle the crisis effectively by maintaining pressure 
on donors to get the funding going. But it has to prove also that is able to make efforts 
on  its  national  budget  for  instance  in  order  to  maintain  effectively  the  future 
infrastructures. The idea of creating a basin agency, independent  to  government and 
representing all the users must be quickly investigated. 
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